Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 20
Issue 1
SYMPOSIUM:
Adolescents in Society: Their Evolving Legal Status

Article 5

2011

The Injustice of Retribution: Toward a
Multisystemic Risk Management Model of Juvenile
Justice
Mark R. Fondacaro

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
Recommended Citation
Mark R. Fondacaro, The Injustice of Retribution: Toward a Multisystemic Risk Management Model of Juvenile Justice, 20 J. L. & Pol'y
(2011).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol20/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

THE INJUSTICE OF RETRIBUTION:
TOWARD A MULTISYSTEMIC RISK
MANAGEMENT MODEL OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE
Mark R. Fondacaro
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................
II. LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY ................................................
III. ECOLOGICAL MODELS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR ...............
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE MODELS OF DUE PROCESS ................
V. GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF A MULTISYSTEMIC RISK
MANAGEMENT MODEL OF JUVENILE JUSTICE .............
VI. OUTLINE OF A MULTISYSTEMIC RISK MANAGEMENT
MODEL OF JUVENILE JUSTICE ...............................

146
147
157
159
162
163

* Professor of Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City
University of New York. J.D. Columbia Law School (1991), Ph.D. Indiana
University (1985). This article is based on a presentation at Adolescents in
Society: Their Evolving Legal Status, a Symposium at Brooklyn Law School
on March 18, 2011. The presentation was based on and supplemented ideas
discussed in CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R. FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT
RISK: A PLEA FOR PREVENTIVE JUSTICE (Oxford University Press 2011).

145

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

146

I. INTRODUCTION
This Article will provide an overview of a Multisystemic
Risk Management (MRM) model of juvenile justice that attempts
to shift the focus of juvenile justice policy from retributive
punishment to recidivism reduction and crime prevention.1 The
MRM model is guided by parallel trends in the fields of
psychology and law towards forward-looking systemic models to
inform decision making and influence human behavior. In
psychology, early models of human behavior that focused
narrowly on internal, unidimensional mental states to explain or
change complex behavior have been supplemented by more
ecological, multisystemic models that consider contextual
influences on human behavior and span biological,
psychological, and social levels of analysis. This body of cutting
edge behavioral science research presents challenges to
traditional mens rea analysis in criminal law and highlights the
potential injustice of retribution as the basis for legal sanctions.
The MRM model promises to improve the fairness,
effectiveness, and efficiency of the juvenile justice system by
integrating these innovations from psychology with converging
trends in law.
In the legal system, and the area of administrative law in
particular, recent conceptualizations of due process have gone
beyond the traditional backward-looking, case-by-case
adversarial model toward more system-wide, forward-looking
managerial models that emphasize measurable fairness,
accuracy, and efficiency in decision making aimed at
2
implementing substantive policy goals. In previous work, I have
attempted to synthesize these converging trends into what I have
1

For an expanded discussion of this perspective, see generally
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R. FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT RISK: A
PLEA FOR PREVENTIVE JUSTICE (2011).
2
See generally Mark R. Fondacaro et al., Reconceptualizing Due
Process in Juvenile Justice: Contributions from Law and Social Science, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 955 (2006) (arguing juvenile justice models that focus on
enhancing measureable fairness, accuracy, and efficiency may be
procedurally and substantively superior to contemporary adult criminal
procedures and culpability-based models).
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called an “Ecological Jurisprudence.”3 In essence, the MRM
model of juvenile justice represents a specific application of the
Ecological Jurisprudence framework. Throughout this Article,
the MRM model will be contrasted with traditional approaches
to juvenile justice, with an emphasis on those rooted in
principles of moral judgment and retribution.4
Part II of this Article identifies and presents challenges to
traditional models of criminal responsibility that are grounded in
outdated and empirically unsupported legal presumptions about
human behavior. Part III examines trends towards more
ecological models of human behavior in the behavioral sciences.
Part IV tracks analogous legal trends in administrative models of
due process and procedural justice. Based on a synthesis of these
parallel trends in the behavioral sciences and the law, Part V
presents general principles of an MRM model of juvenile
justice. Finally, Part VI concludes with an outline that illustrates
what such a model might look like.
II. LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Criminal law doctrines have always reflected common sense
notions about human nature and the causes of human behavior.
3

See generally Mark R. Fondacaro, Toward an Ecological Jurisprudence
Rooted in Concepts of Justice and Empirical Research, 69 UMKC L. REV.
179 (2000) (arguing the law should reflect an updated understanding of
contextual influences on human behavior). As noted previously, “[o]ne of the
first tasks of an ecological jurisprudence would be to bring legal assumptions
about human behavior in line with empirical research conducted over the past
century demonstrating the powerful influences that situational factors have on
guiding and directing individual behavior.” Id. at 192. Moreover, through the
lens of an ecological jurisprudence, basic social psychological research on
procedural and distributive justice becomes more salient, guiding the
development of procedures aimed at promoting fair and accurate decision
making and advancing substantive policy goals, such as recidivism reduction
and crime prevention, that are perceived as legitimate. See id. at 195.
4
See generally Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile
Justice: The Fourth Option, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2009) (arguing a preventionbased juvenile system is superior to the contemporary culpability-based
system).
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In our Western liberal democracy, both criminal law doctrines
and the common sense notions they reflect traditionally have
focused on an individual’s personal choices or conscious will as
the primary if not sole determinative force behind criminal
behavior. Although the law tracks common sense or “folk
psychology” conceptions of human behavior rather closely, it is
much slower and more removed from scientific advances in how
we conceive of complex causes and consequences of human
behavior. For example, I like to ask my students whether they
have ever taken a course in psychology or criminology that has
covered the topic of criminal or deviant behavior. Almost all of
them raise their hands. I then ask them whether they recall the
extensive body of research conducted over the past century on
the “evil doer” theory of crime. Typically, none raise a hand
and most looked puzzled until I inform them that no serious or
systematic research on the causes of crime has been rooted in an
“evil doer” theory. Yet that is the implicit theory underlying the
criminal law.
In traditional criminal law, two conditions must be met in
order for a person to be found guilty of a crime. First, the
person must have committed a bad act (actus reus), and second,
the individual must have had a guilty mind (mens rea) at the
time that he or she committed the offense. Given a particular
bad act (e.g., killing a person), whether or not a defendant is
found to be legally accountable turns on judgments about the
individual’s mental state at the time of the offense. For example,
under the Model Penal Code (MPC): if a person is judged to
have acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, he is
legally accountable for his crime and subject to punishment. If
on the other hand, he is judged to have acted without a guilty
mind or in a non-negligent manner, he is not legally responsible
or subject to criminal punishment.
The severity of punishment sanctioned for a crime under the
MPC increases with the perceived degree of culpability at the
time of the offense (i.e., more punishment for an illegal act
committed with purpose than one committed recklessly). The
justification for meting out more severe punishment for more
culpable mental states is grounded largely in principles of
retribution and just deserts, which is the notion that a person
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should be punished in proportion to his or her moral culpability
for the offense—no more and no less—reflecting the “evil doer”
theory of crime.
As suggested above, the idea that people should be punished
in proportion to their moral blameworthiness is rooted in
Western Liberal notions of autonomous individualism. That is, it
is assumed that people make conscious choices that guide their
behavior and that people who break the law choose to do so and
can choose to do otherwise. This notion of free choice and the
legal presumption of autonomous individualism provide the
rationale and justification for retributive punishment. Although
this legal presumption of autonomous individualism is consistent
with common sense notions about human nature and in fact is
generally consistent with folk psychological notions as well,5 it
is not consistent with the overwhelming weight of behavioral
science research on the actual causes and determinants of human
behavior.6
There are several lines of behavioral science research that
challenge the presumption present in both law and folk
psychology that human behavior is almost fully guided by
conscious human thought. Although a comprehensive review of
these separate lines of research is beyond the scope of this
Article, I will outline their contours and main findings. First, it
is important to point out that in the legal context, determination
of mens rea is based on a retrospective, social judgment about
what a person was (or was not) thinking at the time he or she
committed an illegal act—in essence, retrospective mind reading.
It should be noted that in the criminal law, and under the MPC
in particular, mens rea determinations are presumed to assess
and represent the actual subjective mental state of the defendant
at the time of the offense, with the rare exception of criminal
5

See generally BERTRAM F. MALLE, HOW THE MIND EXPLAINS
BEHAVIOR: FOLK EXPLANATIONS, MEANING, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION
(2004) (analyzing folk psychological notions).
6
See generally Daniel M. Wegner & Thalia Wheatley, Apparent Mental
Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 480
(1999) (explaining various experiments that demonstrate how the subjective
experience of conscious will is distinct from the actual causal chain that leads
people to act).
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offenses based on a negligence standard of culpability. This
raises questions about how reliable and consistent individuals (a
judge or jurors in the case of a criminal trial) are in making
retrospective judgments about what particular defendants were
actually thinking at the time each committed an offense.
Moreover, even if jurors are consistent or reliable, it does not
mean their retrospective judgments of past mental state are
accurate or valid; instead, they may be consistently biased or
just plain wrong.
If the criminal law presumes that almost all of human
behavior is guided by conscious choices about whether to obey
the law, then clearly early theoretical speculation about the
“unconscious” by Sigmund Freud and his followers provides a
potential basis for calling this presumption into question.
However, we do not have to rely on Freudian speculation about
unconscious processes to cast doubt on legal presumptions about
human behavior; there is a new body of systematic behavioral
science research referred to as the “new unconscious” that
draws on cutting edge social psychological and cognitive
neuroscience research to challenge the notion that most human
behavior is guided directly by conscious deliberation or
intentionality.7 This line of research suggests that little, if any,
human behavior conforms to legal presumptions or folk
psychological notions of consciously or cognitively induced
conduct.
Recent efforts to make the best scientific case for a link
between cognition and conduct fall far short of the kind of
dualistic model that underlies criminal liability. Under the Model
Penal Code, a guilty defendant is presumed to have made some
conscious choice to either bring about a specific illegal result
(act with purpose), or to act despite being practically certain that
a criminal outcome would result (act with knowledge), or act
while consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable
risk (act recklessly). The criminal law presumes a direct
connection between a guilty mind and bad behavior. However,
7

See generally THE NEW UNCONSCIOUS (Ran R. Hassin et al. eds.,
2005) (discussing research that indicates that human behavior is less
deliberate than it was traditionally thought to be).
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the weight of cutting edge behavioral science research does not
support this presumed link between thought and action.
For example, in an article entitled Do Conscious Thoughts
Cause Behavior?, Baumeister and his colleagues set out to take
on the emerging consensus in the behavioral and neurosciences
that “conscious thought has little or no impact on behavior.”8
The authors use two different metaphors to explicate the role
that conscious thought plays in behavior: a train whistle and a
bomb fuse. They suggest that the current dominant view in the
behavioral sciences analogizes the relationship between
conscious thought and behavior to the role of a steam whistle on
a train: “[I]t derives from and reveals something about activity
inside the engine, but it has no causal impact on moving the
train.”9 In short, “[b]ehavior does not originate with a conscious
10
decision.” After reinterpreting the literature in the light most
favorable to foundational legal presumptions, they settle on the
analogy of conscious thoughts as serving a similar role as a fuse
serves in detonating a bomb—it does not light the match or
initiate the explosion but it serves a mediating role.11 Rather
than serving as a direct or concurrent causal influence on
behavior, as the law presumes (and indeed requires), Baumeister
and colleagues conclude that the bulk of the research is more
consistent with the view that conscious thought has “offline and
12
indirect effects on later behavior.” Overall, they deduce that
nothing they “reviewed would prove that any behavior emerged

8

See generally Roy F. Baumeister et al., Do Conscious Thoughts Cause
Behavior?, 62 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 331 (2011).
9
Id. at 332 (discussing the view articulated by Thomas Huxley in 1874).
The writers then cite two of the current leading researchers in the field, who
echo this view: “Conscious intentions signal the direction of action—but
without causing the action . . . .” Id. (quoting Daniel M. Wegner & John A.
Bargh, Control and Automaticity in Social Life, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 446, 456 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998)).
10
Id. at 332 (quoting Ap Dijksterhuis et al., Effects of Priming and
Perception on Social Behavior and Goal Pursuit, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE AUTOMATICITY OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES
51, 52 (John A. Bargh ed., 2007)).
11
Id. at 334.
12
Id. at 351.
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from exclusively conscious processes.”13 Yet, that is precisely
the legal presumption that underlies traditional criminal law
doctrine—that culpable mental states occur concurrently with and
induce criminal behavior. Baumeister and his colleagues have
tried to assemble the best available evidence against the
prevailing view in the behavioral sciences that “conscious
processes lack causal efficacy.”14 If the strongest case for the
direct causal influence of mens rea on human behavior does not
support traditional legal presumptions, then continued reliance
on those presumptions in the law is misguided. In addition,
continued reliance is unjust to the extent that such erroneous
presumptions provide the moral justification for retributive
punishment.15
In addition to the lack of scientific evidence to support the
view that conscious thought directly drives behavior, there are
several additional reasons to challenge traditional legal
presumptions about human behavior and the “evil doer” theory
of crime they reflect. Early research conducted by Heider and
Simmel16 suggests that human beings have a natural bias to read
intentionality into behavior when they are asked to explain or
judge the behavior of others, even when intentionality is not
possible. For example, they conducted an experiment in which
subjects observed the movement of three geometric figures (a
large triangle, a small triangle, and a circle) and were asked to
explain the movements of the figures. Nearly all of the subjects
characterized the geometric figures as animated persons, even
when they were asked nothing more than to “write down what
happened in the picture.”17 When asked to interpret the
movements of the figures as human actions, subjects typically
attributed internal motives to the figures. Heider and Simmel
concluded that when people see the big triangle “hitting” the
13

Id. at 354.
Id. at 353.
15
See Mark R. Fondacaro & Lauren G. Fasig, Judging Juvenile
Responsibility: A Social Ecological Perspective, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN,
CULTURE, AND VIOLENCE 355, 368 (Nancy E. Dowd et al. eds., 2006).
16
See generally Fritz Heider & Marianne Simmel, An Experimental
Study of Apparent Behavior, 57 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 243 (1944).
17
Id. at 245.
14
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little triangle (i.e., coming into contact), they tend to infer that
the big triangle intends or desires to “hurt” the little triangle.18
Thus, there seems to be a human readiness or tendency to over
attribute the behavior of others to internal psychological
attributes such as intentionality. This can have severe
consequences for defendants under existing criminal law doctrine
where jurors are asked in first degree murder trials whether the
defendant premeditated and deliberated before killing the victim.
Whether or not premeditation and deliberation are inferred can
mean the difference between life and death for the defendant.
Heider and Simmel’s work suggests that people may have a
natural bias toward inferring internal mental states such as intent
or desire to explain behavior even when an objective judgment
would not support such an inference, as in the case of the
movement of inanimate geometric figures.
In addition to a human tendency to read intentionality into
behavior when it does not or cannot exist, individuals who are
asked to judge the mental state of another may be influenced by
their own subjective experiences of conscious will. This can add
bias to the task of retrospective mind reading if in fact the
subjective experience of conscious will is illusory and has no
causal influence over anyone’s behavior, either as an observer or
as an actor.
Wegner and Wheatley19 have conducted empirical research
studies that support the view that the experience of conscious
will is illusory. They found that people could be influenced to
believe that they had deliberately willed a behavior by merely
being asked to think about the behavior before it was
involuntarily induced. The authors found that the subjective
belief that conscious will had played a role in events was a
function of the extent to which the thought directly preceded the
action, was consistent or compatible with the action, and was the
exclusive apparent cause of the action. They summarized their
findings as follows:
The experience of will is the way our minds portray
their operations to us, then, not their actual operation.
18
19

Id. at 257.
Wegner & Wheatley, supra note 6, at 490.
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Because we have thoughts of what we will do, we can
develop causal theories relating those thoughts to our
actions on the basis of priority, consistency, and
exclusivity. We come to think of these prior thoughts as
intentions, and we develop the strong sense that the
intentions have causal force even though they are actually
just previews of what we may do. The real causal
mechanism is the marvelously intricate web of causation
that is the topic of scientific psychology. The sense of
will is not directly connected to this web and instead is
an expression of our tendency to take what Dennett has
called an “intentional stance” toward people. The
intentional stance involves viewing psychological
causation not in terms of causal mechanism but rather in
terms of agents who have desires and beliefs that cause
their acts. Conscious will is part of the process of taking
an intentional stance toward oneself.
This analysis suggests that the real causal mechanisms
underlying behavior are never present in consciousness.
Rather, the engines of causation are unconscious
mechanisms of mind.20
Echoing this view, Bargh and Chartrand have summarized the
available research and concluded that the lion’s share of human
behavior is guided by non-conscious mental systems rather than
conscious will.21 Finally, Libet conducted an influential study
demonstrating that voluntary human acts and the subjective
experience of intent that precede them are themselves preceded
by unconscious brain activity, suggesting a subordinate role at
best for conscious will as a causal initiating force driving human
22
behavior.
To understand why the legal system, general public, and
even members of the mental health and behavioral science
communities continue to support traditional legal presumptions
20

Id.
See John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable
Automaticity of Being, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 462 (1999).
22
Benjamin Libet, Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of
Conscious Will in Voluntary Action, 8 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 529, 536 (1985).
21
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about human behavior that are inconsistent with scientific
research, we turn to the topic of folk psychology.23 Folk
psychology refers to the “fundamental assumptions [that people
make about] human behavior and its relation to the mind,”
including the capacity to infer mental states and what other
people are thinking.24 In essence, folk psychology or a folk
theory of mind reflects what individuals construe about what
another person thinks or intends, which may or may not actually
capture the subjective conscious experience of the other person.25
So, even if folk psychology concepts correspond directly with
legal concepts or standards of mens rea, neither folk nor legal
concepts necessarily reflect an actual, accurate or valid
characterization of what another person was (or was not)
thinking at the time he or she disobeyed the law.
Malle and Nelson have attempted to integrate aspects of
“legal and layperson view[s] of human behavior” in an effort to
clarify concepts of mens rea in the criminal law.26 They point
out that research on folk psychology faces two primary
challenges in the legal realm.27 The first challenge focuses on
how to establish precise definitions of the concepts of mental
states relevant to judgments about culpability; the second relates
to how to determine the extent to which inferences about mental
states are in fact “reliable and accurate.”28 Unfortunately, their
research, like much of the research in this area, only focused on
the first challenge, as they sought to determine the link between
folk concepts and related legal concepts such as intentionality.29
23

See generally MALLE, supra note 5.
Id. at 30–36.
25
But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962) (including the other
person’s subjective experience in the mens rea requirements for purpose,
knowledge, and recklessness).
26
Bertram F. Malle & Sarah E. Nelson, Judging Mens Rea: The Tension
Between Folk Concepts and Legal Concepts of Intentionality, 21 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 563, 563 (2003).
27
Id. at 564.
28
Id.
29
See id. at 566–78 (suggesting that the legal concepts of mens rea
should be aligned with the ordinary meanings attached to them by
laypersons).
24
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Their results point to similarities and discrepancies between
laypersons’ and legal concepts of mens rea, and they make some
recommendations for bringing them both into better alignment.
However, their research communicates little if anything about
how closely judgments of mens rea based on folk concepts or
legal concepts approximate what a defendant was thinking at the
time he or she committed a crime.
Other attempts to examine laypersons’ understandings of mental
states empirically, and their correspondence with legal definitions
of mental states, have met with very limited success.30 Again, none
of this research gets at the deep and fundamental issue of whether
judgments based on folk or legal concepts are accurate and valid.
Moreover, as noted above, the weight of the behavioral science
research relevant to the nature of the link between human mental
states and behavior suggests that neither folk psychology nor legal
presumptions about the role of mental states in criminal behavior
are likely to be accurate enough to serve as a primary justification
for retributive punishment. Overall, understanding limitations on
the ability to read the minds of criminal defendants retrospectively
may give us reason to question reliance on traditional legal
presumptions as a justification for retributive punishment.
Although the law is slow in tracking scientific advances, it
can and has been moved by convincing theories and research—
consider, for example, how the law was nearly captured by the
field of economics and the rational actor model of human
behavior in the 1990s. However, there are emerging parallel
trends in the behavioral sciences and the law that promise to
converge to transform criminal law, beginning with the juvenile
justice system. These trends, as will be noted in the next two
sections, include a broadening of the focus in the behavioral
sciences from conscious, atomistic mental states such as intent
and deliberation, to unconscious processes and to dynamic,
30

See generally Laurence J. Severance et al., Inferring the Criminal
Mind: Toward a Bridge Between Legal Doctrine and Psychological
Understanding, 20 J. CRIM. JUST. 107 (1992). Severence discusses the results
of his study, which was designed to detect “how laypeople, asked to serve as
‘jurors,’ interpret and apply legal instructions on the definitions of culpable
mental states.” Id. at 107 (“Laypeople do not comprehend mental state
distinctions that are differentiated in legal doctrine.”).
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contextual, and systemic influences on human behavior.
Likewise, the trend in the law, and administrative law in
particular, is to move away from a case-by-case adversarial
model of dispute resolution to a more forward-looking,
managerial system of due process that focuses on fairness and
accuracy in decision making and the implementation of
instrumental policy objectives.
III. ECOLOGICAL MODELS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
Social psychological research conducted throughout the
twentieth century expanded the scope of inquiry about the causes
of human behavior beyond the internal mental states of
individuals to contextual and situational influences. For example,
ecologically-oriented theorists such as Bronfenbrenner,31 Lewin,32
and Moos33 have developed models of human behavior that focus
on the dynamic relationship between the individual and aspects
of his or her social environment. In contrast with traditional
legal presumptions that suggest illegal behavior is the
consequence of a conscious choice that can be fairly judged
through a process of retrospective mind reading, an ecological
perspective suggests that in order to understand why a person
behaves the way he or she does on a particular occasion, one
must understand the ongoing relationship between the individual
and aspects of his or her social environment.
Consistent with an ecological perspective, systematic
research has demonstrated that people tend to overestimate the
degree of personal or conscious control that others have over
their behavior and tend to underestimate the importance of
31

See URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: EXPERIMENTS BY NATURE AND DESIGN (1979) (defining
human development as a permanent change in the way a person views and
handles his or her environment).
32
See KURT LEWIN, PRINCIPLES OF TOPOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 166–92a
(1935) (arguing that “changes both of the person and of environment” must
be considered to understand “psychological processes”).
33
See Rudolf H. Moos, Conceptualizations of Human Environments, 28
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 652, 652–65 (1973) (arguing that knowledge of
environmental conditions is essential to understanding human behavior).
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situational influences—a phenomenon referred to in the
behavioral science literature as the “fundamental attribution
error.”34 For example, when people are confronted with the
unusual behavior of others (e.g., the killing of a parent by a
juvenile), they are prone to try to explain the behavior in terms
of the juvenile’s psychological disposition (e.g., aggressiveness,
impulsivity) rather than the objective situation facing the person
(e.g., escalating physical abuse) or the person’s subjective
construal of the situation (e.g., the belief that he will be killed if
his father flies into a drunken rage). Other research supporting
the importance of contextual influences on human behavior
include Mischel’s analysis of studies demonstrating the
importance of situational influences over personal characteristics
on whether a person lies, cheats, or steals;35 Milgram’s work on
obedience to authority and the willingness of otherwise typical
citizens to administer powerful electric shocks to another person
as punishment for providing incorrect answers;36 and the work of
Darley and his associates demonstrating that ninety percent of
seminary students who were in a hurry to give a lecture on the
Good Samaritan parable were willing to walk right by a person
37
asking for help. These classic social psychological studies
provide additional evidence to challenging the “evil doer” theory
of crime that bases culpability primarily on judgments of a past
mental state rather than taking contextual influences into
account.
In addition to expanding the scope of analysis beyond mental
states, ecological models have been helpful in identifying
contextual domains that both influence deviant behavior (e.g.,
family, peers, school, and neighborhood) and can serve as levers
of change to prevent criminal conduct. For example,
34

RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 120, 122–23 (1980).
35
See WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 23–25 (George
Mandler ed., 1968).
36
Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL &
SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 371, 371–78 (1963).
37
John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho”: A
Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J.
PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 100, 100–08 (1973).

AND
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Multisystemic Therapies have drawn on ecological theory and
research and have developed a systematic intervention program
focusing on multiple levels of analysis (psychological,
interpersonal, community) in various life contexts associated
with risk for delinquent behavior (e.g., social skill deficits,
family conflict, peer pressure, school, neighborhood and
community influences).38 Although traditional psychological
interventions with juvenile offenders based on intrapsychic
explanations of delinquency have been largely ineffective, stateof-the-art multisystemic interventions have been able to reduce
recidivism rates from around seventy percent to around twenty
percent, even for very serious offenders. This suggests that a
shift in focus away from retrospective mind reading and
retributive models of juvenile justice toward a more forwardlooking risk management model focused on recidivism reduction
and prevention of criminal behavior holds great promise for
juvenile justice reform. Moreover, recent reconceptualizations of
due process in the juvenile justice context provide opportunities
for developing a forward-looking system aimed not at
punishment or just deserts but the implementation of
instrumental policy goals of recidivism reduction and crime
prevention.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE MODELS OF DUE PROCESS
The shift in the behavioral sciences toward more systemic
models of human behavior is consistent with a shift in the law
toward administrative models of due process.39 This shift began
primarily to address dispute resolution in the civil law context
and gradually migrated to areas like child support enforcement
and drug and mental health courts. Procedural and efficiency
considerations drove changes in the child support context. It was
simply easier to process the large influx of cases and collect
larger total sums of delinquent child support payments by using
mass mailings threatening to revoke the motor vehicle or
professional licenses of delinquent obligors if they failed to pay
38
39

See generally SLOBOGIN & FONDACARO, supra note 1.
See generally Fondacaro et al., supra note 2.
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their arrears than it was to use traditional adversarial trial
procedures to pursue individual claims on a case-by-case basis.40
In addition to efficiency considerations, institution of drug and
mental health courts was driven by a change in substantive
policy objectives—moving away from retributive punishment
toward treatment and recidivism reduction. These new policy
goals were facilitated by an increasingly managerial,
administrative model that tracks the success and failure of
individual defendants and various treatment programs. In the
juvenile justice context, the need to handle large numbers of
cases efficiently and effectively, coupled with a shift in policy
towards evidence-based multisystemic interventions aimed at
recidivism reduction and crime prevention, seems to invite a
more administrative model of due process as well.
In the adult criminal justice system, there are clear
constitutional constraints on moving toward administrative
procedures. For adult criminal defendants, specific adversarial
procedures are required by the explicit texts of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments. While due process is also fundamental to the
juvenile justice system, due process for juveniles is anchored
primarily in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and principles of “fundamental fairness,” not the
explicit texts of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. This opens the
door for procedural reform in the juvenile justice system that
promotes fair, accurate and efficient decision making and
facilitates the implementation of a multisystemic risk
management model of juvenile justice aimed at promoting
recidivism reduction and crime prevention. One of the major
advantages of a fundamental fairness view of due process is that
the degree of fairness and accuracy of decision making can be
judged based on empirical evidence rather than by whether
traditional procedural safeguards have been incorporated into the
decision making process. Whether particular procedural
safeguards actually enhance or diminish accuracy and fairness in
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decision making is “recast into empirical hypotheses rather than
framed, as they have been up to now, by reference to adult
criminal procedure requirements.”41
Administrative law scholars have been the first to suggest
that the courts are not an institution particularly well-suited for
taking useful advantage of behavioral science expertise.42 Courts
tend to be reactive, backward looking, and to lack the necessary
resources to locate and use research findings. Administrative
bodies, on the other hand, are better equipped for this task.
They tend to be forward looking, aimed at program and policy
implementation, and to have the institutional expertise and
resources to seek out and use behavioral science research to
inform decision making. If a fundamental fairness approach to
due process requires fair and accurate decision making
performed in an efficient manner, then traditional procedural
safeguards are seen as relevant but not necessarily essential.
Procedural safeguards are considered to be consistent with a
fundamental fairness view if they can be shown empirically to
be tied to fairness, accuracy, and efficiency in decision making.
This suggests that the attainment of fundamental fairness in
juvenile justice might best be accomplished under an
administrative model of decision making that puts in place a
management system for the ongoing evaluation of both
individual cases and the functioning of the system as a whole.
Such a performance-based management system could focus on
both procedural and substantive criteria—in essence, evaluating
the accomplishment of both due process and recidivism
reduction. As noted above, many of the questions about what
constitutes due process would be recast into empirical questions.
For example, does the assistance of counsel actually contribute
to perceived fairness, to accuracy of decision making, or to
better life outcomes for juveniles? Likewise, is crossexamination actually the great engine of truthseeking, as the
Supreme Court has characterized it? Or does is it actually
contribute to obfuscation and delay, as others have suggested?
Are judges necessarily the best decision makers with respect to
41
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truth seeking and fairness? What effect does the privilege against
self-incrimination actually have on truth seeking? On perceived
fairness? On substantive outcomes? Is this privilege perhaps less
essential in a forward looking regime using effective, state-ofthe-art interventions? These are just a few of the questions that
might be addressed by future research and the MRM model of
juvenile justice.43 The next section outlines some of the basic
principles of an MRM model, which provide a comprehensive
framework for procedural and substantive reform.
V. GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF A MULTISYSTEMIC RISK
MANAGEMENT MODEL OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
Several guiding principles to establishing an MRM model of
juvenile justice can be distilled from an integration of the
converging trends in the behavioral sciences and the law towards
systemic approaches to decision making. However, it is
important to note that these are only guiding principles and not a
fixed alternative to the current juvenile justice system. What
Professor Slobogin and I have proposed in our book, Juveniles
at Risk: A Plea for Preventive Justice, is the development of a
performance-based management system that promotes fair,
accurate, and efficient decision making to facilitate achievement
of the policy goals of recidivism reduction and crime prevention.
If data shows that the current system can better advance these
goals, then it should be kept in place until we find more
effective alternatives that can be documented with empirical
research. The current system and its various facets serve as the
baseline for comparison. Overall, we offer a framework that is
inherently a work in progress, subject to ongoing evaluation and
evidence-based reform.
The guiding principles of this framework, which are
discussed in greater detail in Juveniles at Risk, include the
following. First, the juvenile justice system should be forward
looking and focused on behavior, rather than past mental states,
and on recidivism reduction and crime prevention rather than
retributive punishment. Second, a juvenile justice system based
43
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on an MRM model should be grounded in administrative models
of justice aimed at comprehensive, least restrictive risk
management rather than culpability assessment. Third, decision
making should be based on input and expertise of individuals
from diverse disciplinary backgrounds. Legal training is not
sufficient to address the range of organizational, clinical,
psychological, developmental, educational, and evaluation
research issues that must be managed. Fourth, decision making
should be evidence-based, with the juvenile justice system
serving as a natural laboratory for basic and applied research on
procedural and substantive issues relevant to procedural justice,
risk management, youth development, recidivism reduction,
crime prevention, and public acceptance of alternatives to
retributive punishment for juveniles. Finally, the juvenile justice
system should be ecologically self-aware and have the
organizational capacity to understand and foster mutually
informative and beneficial relationships with other youthsocializing institutions such as families, schools, communities,
law enforcement, and the mental health, health care, and adult
criminal justice systems.
VI. OUTLINE OF A MULTISYSTEMIC RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
This brings us to the question of what an MRM model of
juvenile justice might look like. The general outline provided
below is intended to serve as the basis for comparison with our
current system:44
 Jurisdiction is focused on overt behavior and
determined by a legally-trained decision maker.
 A Multidisciplinary Risk Management Team
develops, implements, evaluates and refines an
Individual Risk Management Plan.
 Data and feedback from IRMP are used to guide
intervention and termination of intervention at the
individual level.
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Case-level data is incorporated into a system-wide
Information Management System that is used to
guide program and policy development and
reform.
 Outreach and program evaluation are built into the
juvenile justice system.
The juvenile justice system envisioned above has the
potential to be quite different from the retributive- and
punishment-oriented regimes currently in place throughout the
United States. This Article has attempted to outline why the
juvenile justice system should change, and how it could be
reformed. First, the current system is rooted in an outdated
model of criminal justice—one that focuses on culpability
assessment and retributive punishment rooted in notions of just
deserts. While the retributive model purports to reflect moral
judgment, it really reflects retrospective social judgment based
on an overly narrow focus on mental states that humans
(including judges and jurors) have great difficulty assessing
accurately and which the scientific consensus suggests has little
if any direct causal influence on behavior. Given the weight of
the scientific evidence, to continue the status quo is likely not
only misguided, but unjust. Reform is clearly warranted.
However, this does not mean that the system can, will, or
should be transformed overnight. The current system can serve
as a baseline for reform. Some states may pursue small and
incremental changes. Others may opt for large scale systemic
reforms. In all cases, the key consideration is whether the
reforms are making things better or worse than the status quo.
In order to achieve reforms, those interested in promoting
juvenile justice must capitalize on converging trends in the
behavioral sciences and the law toward more forward-looking,
systemic models of decision making and policy implementation.
The juvenile justice system may be an ideal place to initiate such
reforms. First of all, the juvenile justice system is afforded
greater legal flexibility regarding due process considerations.
Secondly, the general public is more willing to let go of the
reflexive urge to punish juvenile offenders, and to embrace more
rational policy objectives such as recidivism reduction and crime
prevention in the juvenile justice context. We have the tools
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necessary in both the behavioral sciences and the law to create a
truly fair and just juvenile justice system. This Article is an
attempt to stimulate debate and endorse evidence-based reforms.

